Talk that Tehran is getting around the US blockade by passing its crude off as Iraqi has grown louder as Chinese teapots turn to Basrah grades. We see this probability as very low. There is no pipeline, trucking at scale could not be hidden, Baghdad has too much to lose, and Iran has not loaded a crude cargo since late August. Rail to China offers no meaningful alternative either.
Basrah Medium/Heavy and Urals diffs NE Asia to remain supported. Teapots are already paying a minimum of $18/bbl over ICE Brent, and there is no disguised Iranian supply to relieve them. Chinese imports of Basrah grades jumped to 1.16 mbd in September, close to pre-war volumes.
Shandong teapot runs: Bearish into November. With no hidden Iranian feedstock, inventories at some plants could run out by end-October. Basrah or Urals alone cannot fully replace more than 1 mbd of discounted Iranian crude at teapot-friendly prices. Run cuts are more likely than a full switch.
The speculation draws on several threads. First, China’s independent refiners have turned to Basrah Heavy and Basrah Medium after the blockade cut off Iranian supply, which has prompted questions about whether Iran is reviving an old workaround of disguising its own oil as Iraqi. In 2025, the US Treasury sanctioned a network of companies run by Iraqi-British national Salim Ahmed Said which used to ship Iranian oil disguised as, or blended with, Iraqi oil.
With the US blockade in place since mid-July, Iranian oil transit through the Strait of Hormuz has cratered to zero. Iran’s oil on water volumes outside the blockade have decreased to 8 mb, down from nearly 90 mb following the MoU implementation. We estimate this means Iran’s oil revenues will face a cliff by mid-December at the latest. Therefore, the use of such blending tactics grows in importance for Iran in order to sell its oil. However, we estimate there is no clear and easy workaround for Iran at this moment.

Source: Kpler

Source: Kpler
Cross-border crude pipelines have been discussed for two decades and never built. An MoU for a Basra–Abadan line was first signed in 2004, sized at around 150 kbd of Iraqi crude flowing to the Abadan refinery. A later Kirkuk–Abadan proposal has seen no development since 2017 and has been cancelled. Both projects were designed to move Iraqi crude into Iran, not the reverse. The two countries have even been at odds regarding the development of cross-border fields, such as Azadegan / Majnoon or Yadavaran / Faihaa. Since both countries are net oil exporters and their main oil regions originate from the same geological plays (the Arabian basin and the Zagros foldbelt), meaning oilfields are geographically close, there has never been a need for a cross-border oil pipeline. The only operating energy pipelines between the two countries carry Iranian gas westward.
Technically, the easiest solution for Iran to sell crude via Iraq would be to truck volumes to Basra. A road tanker carries roughly 200 bbl (about 32 m³).
VolumeTruckloadsTime to fill at 50 kbdTime to fill at 100 kbd50 kbd250 per day––100 kbd500 per day––Suezmax (1 mb)~5,000~20 days~10 daysVLCC (2 mb)~10,000~40 days~20 days
Source: Kpler
With a round trip from the Khuzestan fields to Basra of at least a day, including border formalities, that implies a rotating fleet of several hundred to a thousand trucks. They would funnel through a handful of crossings such as Shalamcheh, every day, for weeks. A convoy on that scale would be visible in commercial satellite imagery and would almost certainly surface on social media. The crude would also have to enter the Basrah export system through onshore storage, which would require complicity at several levels of Iraq’s oil sector.
This is where, despite the strong political links that exist between Tehran and Baghdad, such a method becomes highly unlikely. Iraq is already living with the constraints of US sanctions on its trade with Iran. Payments for Iranian gas and electricity are deposited in accounts at the Central Bank of Iraq and the Trade Bank of Iraq. Iran is seeking around $11 billion in unpaid dues, and in July, Baghdad and Washington agreed that the debt would be settled in goods such as food and medicine rather than cash. Gas deliveries have been patchy since the war began, with flows restarting at about 5 mcm/d after the South Pars strike, a fraction of the contracted 50 mcm/d.
Washington’s enforcement has also moved close to the Iraqi state. In May, OFAC designated Iraq’s deputy oil minister for helping divert Iraqi oil to Said’s network and falsifying provenance documents. Iraq’s oil revenues sit at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. This gives Washington leverage over Iraqi foreign policy and willingness to breach US sanctions. The residual risk therefore lies with rogue networks rather than the state. However, those networks have always needed the sea.
Unlike in periods before the blockade, there is no more seaborne Iranian oil to be falsified or mixed with to begin with. The documented schemes all began with an Iranian cargo at sea. Said’s network mixed Iranian oil with Iraqi oil in storage tanks and through ship-to-ship transfers near its terminal. A second network sanctioned in September 2025 blended Iranian and Iraqi oil through STS transfers in the Gulf and in Iraqi ports, using AIS spoofing and night-time transfers.
That first step is now missing. Iranian crude loadings fell from about 1.2–1.5 mbd in early July to zero from the week of 31 August. Iran-origin cargoes already loaded remain bottled up along its coast. Any of those tankers sailing to Iraqi waters for a transfer would have to cross a US patrol. We understand that US Navy warnings are preventing even Iranian ballasters from moving and loading crude from terminals, let alone allowing a laden tanker to move towards Iraqi waters.

Source: Kpler
Iraq’s own numbers show no anomaly either. Basrah seaborne exports averaged about 2.44 mbd in September, and more than 3 mbd since late September, still below the roughly 3.3 mbd of January–February. Iraq is not exporting more than it can explain, and it has ample unused export capacity of its own.

Source: Kpler. The figures don’t include potential Basrah volumes that are STS’d in the Gulf of Oman
If Iranian crude were reaching Shandong disguised as Basrah, teapots would not be running inventories down towards zero. Nor would they be paying premiums of up to $18/bbl over ICE Brent for Basrah or Urals. The scramble for prompt supply is consistent with a genuine loss of more than 1 mbd of discounted Iranian barrels.

Source: Argus Media
The China–Iran rail corridor is real, and some oil may have moved along it, although this remains unverified. Logistical challenges are massive: the rail line goes to Tehran, while Iran’s oil is produced in the south. Some 200-250 kbd of oil is piped to the Tehran refinery, some volumes could be diverted to trains but volumes would be extremely marginal.
The physical constraints are severe. Iran’s network uses standard gauge, while Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan use the 1,520 mm CIS gauge. Wagons must have their bogies exchanged at Sarakhs, which has capacity for about 400 wagons a day across all cargo. A second gauge break follows at the Chinese border.
A Russian-gauge tank car holds about 450 bbl. Moving 100 kbd would therefore take over 200 cars a day, more than half of Sarakhs’ total exchange capacity. With round trips approaching a month, it would also need a pool of 5,000–6,000 tank cars. Iran’s oilfields are in the south, far from the northeastern border crossings, and the corridor’s traffic runs mostly from China into Iran.
Rail costs around 30% more than sea freight, with transit times of 12 to 15 days. The rail line also lands in Beijing, far from Iran’s market in China, which is concentrated in Shandong.
Political risk adds to this. Turkmenistan has declared neutrality and will be wary of being seen as a back door for Iran. On 1 October, the US State Department announced sanctions targeting illicit funding in Iran’s rail sector.
Every channel for disguising Iranian crude as Iraqi faces a severe constraint. There is no pipeline. Trucks cannot carry meaningful volumes unseen, and rail can carry little. The maritime route the old schemes relied on has been shut since Iran’s loadings stopped in late August. We therefore see the probability that Iran is exporting meaningful crude volumes via Iraq as extremely low and nearly impossible.
