The 60-day window under the Islamabad MoU lapsed on 17 August with no deal, no extension, and no talks under way. Kpler data shows the truce cleared the war's stranded backlog in 3 weeks and moved roughly 374 mb of crude out of the Gulf, but it never reopened the strait. This final piece in our weekly series closes the 60-day ledger and maps the export system the MoU leaves behind.
In the third week of the US-Iran MoU, 95% of the barrels leaving the Gulf could be traced to the terminal that loaded them. In the final week, 66% could not. That reversal, more than any statement from Washington or Tehran, is the story of the 60 days.
The 60-day window established by the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of 17 June lapsed at midnight on 17 August with no peace agreement, no extension, and no active talks. It was a formality rather than a cliff-edge. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had dismissed the premise days earlier, saying Tehran "never had a ceasefire that would now need to be extended", and President Trump answered "No" when asked about an extension. On expiry day, Tehran declared the MoU nullified by US violations and announced mandatory transit permits and maritime environmental tolls; Washington rejected the claims and kept its convoy escorts and blockade enforcement. Brent crossed $90/bbl.
The physical record is easier to score than the diplomacy. The war closed the strait on 28 February, cutting off the outlet for roughly a fifth of global seaborne oil and stranding fleets of laden tankers inside the Gulf. The MoU reopened it partially: roughly 374 mb of crude cleared the Mideast Gulf across the window, about 6.1 mbd, against 2.3 mbd over the blockaded months from April to the signing. Clearance here means non-Iranian Hormuz transits plus Gulf of Oman net exports, a combined measure built to avoid double counting. But the truce never came close to restoring the strait: the run-rate is around 40% of the ~15 mbd Hormuz averaged in 2025, more than half of it moved in the first 3 weeks, and by the end the flow was thinner, darker, and re-accumulating behind the chokepoint.
Weekly combined Crude/Co clearance versus Mideast Gulf Crude/Co loadings, MoU weeks 1–9 (mb)

Source: Kpler

*Floor: the most recent week carries the heaviest confirmation lag, and revision history suggests the true figure will settle 1.5 to 2 times higher. Clearance and loadings are Crude/Co only. Total crossings of all liquids and LPG averaged 8.8 mbd across the window, roughly 547 mb, of which crude and condensate made up 418 mb.
Did the backlog clear? Half of it did. The war left 2 stacked problems inside the Gulf, and the MoU solved only 1 of them. The first was stranded ships: idle floating storage of crude, laden tankers sitting for a week or more, peaked at about 104 mb in late April and still stood at 61 mb when the MoU was signed. Within 3 weeks the truce cut it to 16 mb, and that is the backlog clearance the strong early numbers reflect. The second problem was the flow itself, and it never healed. Total crude on water inside the Mideast Gulf and Gulf of Oman fell from 165 mb at signing to 107 mb by 7 July, then stopped falling. It stood at roughly 130 mb as the window closed on 16 August, easing to 110 mb by 18 August, still above the roughly 96 mb of the war's start. The stranded ships got out; the system that put them there is still in place, and by the final week it was refilling.
Crude on water (left) and floating storage (right) inside the Mideast Gulf and Gulf of Oman, 1 March to 18 August (mb)

Source: Kpler fleet metrics
The strait went dark twice. The first measure is the share of clearance surfacing only as Gulf of Oman net exports: cargo appearing in the Gulf of Oman with no confirmed upstream, the residue of the shuttle system we mapped in our June explainer. Before the MoU that unattributed share ran at around 28%. At the Week 3 peak it fell to 5%, as vessels loaded openly and crossed with the Automatic Identification System (AIS) on. From Week 4 it ratcheted straight back, reaching 66% of a shrinking total in the expiry week. The second measure is the route label on each crossing. The southern Omani corridor opened under JMIC guidance on 20 June, peaked at 48 crossings in Week 2, and was effectively gone by Week 4 after attacks on vessels using it. The IMO route followed, at zero from Week 5. What was left was a binary strait: a fading Iranian route, and a Dark/Unknown share that never fell below 44% and closed the window above 80%. The collapse was cross-product, too: LPG crossings fell to zero in mid-July, and LNG carriers halted for almost 3 weeks before resuming in late July, running dark. The MoU's visibility dividend was real, and it did not survive the MoU.
Weekly Strait of Hormuz crossings by confirmed route, all vessels, MoU weeks 1–9 (count)

Source: Kpler
The 6 dates that decided the window:
The pattern across those dates is symmetrical: each side's headline concession was withdrawn within a month, and each blamed the other's violation. By the final fortnight, the argument had moved on from the MoU entirely, to whether Iran can charge for passage that Washington insists is free.
The full report is available to Kpler Insight clients and contains:
Kpler delivers unbiased, expert-driven intelligence that helps you stay ahead of supply, demand, and market shifts.
Trade smarter. Request access to Kpler today.
